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Abstract
We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market
experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at
a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker’s payoff, it imposes a negative
externality on others and may trigger further unraveling. Our data suggest that
subjects reveal their productivity less frequently than predicted in equilibrium. A
loaded frame emphasizing personal information about workers’ health leads to even
less revelation. We show that three canonical behavioral models all predict too little
rather than too much revelation: level-k reasoning, quantal-response equilibrium,
and to a lesser extent inequality aversion.
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1 Introduction
Privacy concerns and the treatment of personal data and are at the center of current policy
debates.1 With the rise of digital data processing and the increased communication of
information via the Internet, a wealth of personal data can be accumulated and distributed
at low cost. As a result, private enterprises and governmental institutions alike face new
challenges of how to adequately handle the private data of their citizens and clients.
Cases where individuals voluntarily disclose private information are regarded as in-
creasingly important. For example, prospective tenants or job applicants often voluntarily
disclose verified personal information. In the US, online services such as MyBackground-
Check.com provide verified information on, for example, drug tests, criminal records and
previous rental addresses to prospective landladies or employers.2 New-generation pass-
ports and identity cards often contain biometric data, and the policy debate seems to
regard whether people can freely agree to include the sensitive information as relevant.3
Another example are health or pregnancy tests voluntarily provided to existing or future
employers.4, 5
The main reason why the voluntary disclosure of personal information can raise privacy
concerns is due to unraveling effects. In a world where credible signals can easily be
obtained and distributed, these signals will be used by those with the best medical records,
credit scores, etc. This may put pressure on others to disclose similar information about
themselves because not disclosing will be interpreted as a signal of low quality. Thus,
granting people the right to decide whether to disclose can be less of a voluntary choice
than it seems at first sight. Or, as Posner (1998, p. 103) succinctly puts it “As for privacy
in general, it is difficult to see how a pooling equilibrium is avoided in which privacy is
‘voluntarily’ surrendered, making the legal protection of privacy futile.”
The importance of the unraveling argument is also reflected in the current legal debate.
Peppet (2011) summarizes the legal perspective and argues that the voluntary disclosure
of private information is crucial because of unraveling effects. The challenge to regulating
voluntary disclosure is that there are always some agents in whose interest it is to disclose
their information. Limits to inquiry that forbid an uninformed party from seeking infor-
mation from an informed counterpart may not be sufficient as the informed party might
1To quantify this statement, we conducted a Google Books Ngram Viewer comparison of several keywords
and compared them to the term “privacy concerns”. We found that the use of the term “privacy concerns”
in the English literature has been increasing steadily since the Seventies. This is in contrast to other
topics like “nuclear threat” (in decline and nowadays occurring less frequently than “privacy concerns”)
or “racial discrimination” (more frequent than “privacy concerns”, but also in decline).
2Connolly (2008) explicitly advises applicants in the job market to use such online services (pp. 59-60).
3See Curtis (2006) for the debate in Australia, Acharya and Kasprzycki (2010) for Canada, Probst (2011)
for Germany, Grijpink (2001) for the Netherlands.
4Some of Apple Inc. suppliers screened their workers with health and pregnancy test (Apple 2012). See also
New-York Times, January 26, 2012. The unraveling argument suggests that whether workers voluntarily
agreed to take the tests is immaterial.
5Further examples, discussed in Peppet (2011), include car insurance policies or rental car contracts where
drivers can voluntarily agree to have the car monitored with GPS-based systems.
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feel that it is in her interest to disclose the information. A means to avoid unraveling
may be to completely forbid the use of certain information, as for example in the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) passed in 2008 in the US to prohibit the use
of genetic information by insurers.
Our goal is to contribute to the debate of whether voluntary information disclosure
is problematic because of unraveling effects. Will there be complete unraveling in the
markets? Will there be too much or too little disclosure of information? Will participants
anticipate the behavior of others and the externalities imposed by their choices? Does the
decision to reveal information depend on the context such as the perceived sensitivity of
the information?
We study the voluntary disclosure of information in a laboratory experiment with the
help of a setting that we call revelation game. In a labor market with a lemons structure
(Akerlof 1970), workers can truthfully reveal their productivity to employers at a cost.
Revelation correctly uncovers the worker’s productivity, and it imposes an externality
on others. Equilibrium play involves information revelation by the workers with the
highest productivity, where the share of workers who reveal in equilibrium depends on
the revelation cost and the distribution of productivities. When revelation costs are
negligible, there is complete unraveling: only the workers with the lowest productivity
will choose not to reveal, but the very act of concealing makes it possible to identify their
productivity in equilibrium.
In the experiments we consider three different labor markets. Depending on the experi-
mental parameters, either complete unraveling, partial unraveling or no unraveling (except
for the player with the highest productivity) should occur. We conduct the experiments
with a loaded frame (where “workers” can purchase a fictitious “health certificate”) and
with a neutral frame as a control treatment.
We find that revelation rates are systematically lower compared to the equilibrium
prediction. Workers who are supposed to reveal in equilibrium fail to take the equilib-
rium choice significantly more often than workers who should conceal their productivity
in equilibrium. Strengthening these findings, we observe only moderate learning effects
toward equilibrium over several rounds of play. Moreover, we find a statistically and eco-
nomically significant framing effect: there is more revelation and equilibrium consistency
in neutrally framed sessions. Furthermore, it appears that the labor-market-health frame
triggers privacy concerns.
We then explore the reasons for incomplete unraveling. Our aim is to uncover system-
atic reasons for concealing one’s productivity. We show that three canonical behavioral
models consistently predict too little rather than too much revelation: level-k reasoning,
quantal-response equilibrium, and inequality aversion. Our interest is not in comparing
the performance of the three different models but rather in employing the models to
uncover the mechanisms that can stop or mitigate unraveling.
A central prerequisite of the unraveling argument is that players are capable of several
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steps of reasoning. Typically, only the most productive workers will find it in their interest
to reveal information when others conceal. However, given the most productive players
reveal, more players will reveal, and so on. Such iterated steps of reasoning are captured
by the level-k model.6 We show for our game that revelation may require a large number
of such steps of reasoning whereas concealing always requires only one step of reasoning.
Since experiments show that participants exhibit limited depth of reasoning, the level-k
model suggests an asymmetry in our game: workers who should reveal in equilibrium will
be more likely to fail to do so (that is, they conceal) than workers who should conceal.
Hence, the level-k model implies incomplete unraveling.
Following McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), we analyze the quantal response equilibrium
(QRE) of the revelation game. The QRE suggests that the payoff from concealing, all
else being equal, will become more attractive than the payoff from revealing for workers
with a low productivity. The reason is that, for low productivity workers, the (expected)
payoff differences between concealing and revealing are small. This difference is larger
for high productivity workers who therefore reveal more often in QRE. If the equilibrium
calls for revelation, QRE suggests (at least for the parameter we estimate) that a sizeable
share of decisions by low productivity workers will be mistaken. Moreover, QRE may
even suggest that workers who reveal in equilibrium exhibit non-monotonic behavior: the
probability of revelation initially decreases in the rationality parameter before it increases
and approaches one asymptotically. Such non-monotonicities do not occur for workers
who conceal in equilibrium. As a result, QRE players will frequently fail to reveal but
will less often fail to conceal.
We also investigate the role of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) for the
results. Sufficiently inequality-averse players will be reluctant to disclose information
because of the externality this imposes on the other players. Thus, there can be less
revelation than with standard preferences. More revelation is, by contrast, difficult to
reconcile with inequality aversion: choosing to reveal when (standard) equilibrium calls
for concealment will often reduce payoffs and increase payoff inequalities. It follows that
inequality aversion is also consistent with our under-revelation result.7
To sum up, models of bounded rationality (level-k, QRE) and models of other-regarding
preferences all suggest incomplete unraveling. Given the strong interest in unraveling in
6The level-k model was introduced by Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Nagel (1995). Its original application
was to explain subjects’ behavior in p-beauty-contest games (compare, for example, Bosch-Domenech,
Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2002), Kocher and Sutter (2005) or Bran˜as-Garza, Garcia-Mun˜oz and
Gonza´lez (2012) for some other studies of this kind). Further applications include private-value auctions
(Crawford and Iriberri 2007) or centipede games (Kawagoe and Takizawa 2012, Ho and Su 2013). Some
games such as the “20-11 money request game” have specifically been designed for the elicitation of
k-levels (Arad and Rubinstein 2012, Lindnera and Sutter 2013). There are also extensions of the model
such as Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) or Goeree and Holt (2004).
7Nevertheless, below, we do not consider inequality aversion to be a prime explanation for our experiments.
The reason is that the model has multiple equilibria, and the patterns we observe in the data only occur
with a low frequency in the simulations of a calibrated version of the inequality model of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999).
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the theoretical literature, we believe that these behavioral aspects should receive more at-
tention. If under certain conditions unraveling is less severe than predicted by the theory,
this can affect the optimal policy choice with respect to privacy protection.
Taken together, our results do not lead to unambiguous policy conclusions. On the
one hand, the unraveling of private information due to voluntarily disclosure may be less
problematic than economic theory suggests. Players fail to reveal personal information
because of bounded rationality or other-regarding preferences. Further, some players
have a non-standard preference against revealing their personal data in connection with
privacy-sensitive issues like health, as suggested by the comparison of the neutral and the
loaded framing of the experiment. On the other hand, we observe a substantial amount of
revelation in the experiment. This suggests that unraveling effects in voluntary disclosure
regimes can force players to reveal more information. Such effects should be considered
in the context of privacy policies involving free choice.
In the next section, we review the relevant literature. Section 3 introduces the revela-
tion game and Section 4 the experimental implementation and the different treatments.
Section 5 reports on the results. Section 6 investigates reasons for the behavioral patterns
we observe and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Following the introduction of the lemons problem by Akerlof (1970), the costly but truthful
revelation of private information—the certificate solution to the lemons problem—was
suggested by Viscusi (1978). Subsequently, it was shown by Milgrom (1981), Grossman
and Hart (1980) and Grossman (1981) that taking no action (not acquiring a certificate)
may reveal an agent’s type when other agents have an incentive to disclose information.
They pointed out that complete unraveling may result (see also Jovanovic (1982)).8
More recently, Hermalin and Katz (2006) investigated the impact of privacy regimes
on consumer and producer rents in markets with price discrimination, taking into account
unraveling effects. They argue that markets may be ex post efficient due to unraveling.
However, laws banning unraveling can improve welfare ex ante because the socially waste-
ful revelation costs can be avoided.
While information disclosure has received much attention in the theoretical literature,
only Forsythe, Isaac and Palfrey (1989) have studied unraveling in an experiment.9 They
8Just as in our markets where unraveling implies disclosure of information, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010)
show that unraveling occurs when information is fully disclosed in the context of matching markets.
Either, for example, schools do not disclose information about grades fully or - with full disclosure -
unraveling to earlier contract dates with less information available occurs.
9There is also an empirical literature on the topic based on field data. Jin (2005) reports evidence on
incomplete unraveling among Health Maintenance Organizations which may disclose information on the
quality of their services on a voluntary basis. As for mandatory disclosure Jin and Leslie (2003) find that
the introduction of hygiene quality grade cards for restaurants increases the consumers’ sensitivity for
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study a game where sellers have superior information about the good compared to the
buyers and can decide whether to reveal this information. The game has multiple Nash
equilibria. Full unraveling in the sense of sellers disclosing their private information about
the good takes place in the unique sequential equilibrium, which experimental subjects
learn to play in the course of several rounds of play. Our game differs from the one
in Forsythe et al. (1989) in that it has a unique equilibrium with partial unraveling.
Moreover, the cost of revelation is negligible in Forsythe et al. (1989) but not in our
setup.
Our experiments have some bearing on the question of how people make choices re-
garding their personal data. To our knowledge, we are the first to study the unraveling
of privacy experimentally.10 However, there is a study on the framing effects of defaults
used in electronic commerce for various privacy settings, see Johnson, Bellman and Lohse
(2002). Experiments have also been used to investigate decisions regarding personal data.
When making purchasing decisions, consumers have been found to provide personal data
freely, even when it is relatively easy and costless to avoid it (see Acquisti and Grossklags
(2005) and Beresford, Ku¨bler and Preibusch (2012)). This behavior in combination with
a strong concern for privacy protection voiced in surveys has been called the “privacy
paradox”.
In an experiment on information acquisition and revelation by Schudy and Utikal
(2012), the impact of different data security schemes on information acquisition is inves-
tigated. The paper employs a loaded frame where subjects can acquire the results of a
binary test (for example, an HIV test). The data security regimes are perfect privacy (no
one but the testee gets to know the test result), imperfect privacy (there is a 50% chance
that the results of the test will be leaked to a player interacting with the testee), and au-
tomatic dissemination where the test results are automatically disclosed to both players
in a group. The authors find that information acquisition, that is, taking a test, is almost
complete whenever there is some data security. The only treatment with incomplete data
acquisition is the one with the automatic dissemination of the test results.
3 The Revelation Game
Our design is based on a labor market with a lemons structure. There are n ≥ 2 workers
with n ∈ N . Worker i has productivity θi. Let Θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θn} and assume w.l.o.g.
hygiene issues in restaurants. More recently, Lewis (2011) pointed out that a lack of (voluntarily provided)
ex-post verifiable information on used cars (photos, text hinting at rust, scratches, etc.) has a negative
influence on the selling price in internet auctions. When such information is not easily verifiable (e.g.,
baseball trading cards), Jin and Kato (2008) show that cards of alleged high quality trade at substantially
higher prices although their actual quality is not distinguishable compared to other cards.
10The issue of the signaling of private information is broadly related. The experimental literature on
this includes early contributions like Miller and Plott (1985), Brandts and Holt (1992), Potters and van
Winden (1996), and Cooper, Garvin and Kagel (1997), and more recent papers like Ku¨bler, Mu¨ller and
Normann (2008), Cooper and Kagel (2009) and de Haan, Offerman and Sloof (2011).
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that θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ ... ≤ θn.
All n workers simultaneously choose between two actions, to reveal or to conceal
their productivity. Revelation causes a cost of c > 0 and correctly reveals the worker’s
productivity. Let Ii ∈ {0, 1} be a function indicating whether worker i has chosen to
reveal her productivity, with Ii = 1 denoting revelation and Ii = 0 concealment.
Workers’ payoffs are determined as follows. If worker i chooses to reveal, i earns her
productivity minus the revelation cost. If not, she receives the average productivity of all
workers who have chosen not to reveal. Formally, i’s payoff is
Πi =
θi − c if Ii = 1 (reveal)∑n
j=1(1− Ij)θj/
∑n
j=1(1− Ij) if Ii = 0 (conceal).
These payoffs can be thought to arise in a competitive labor market where two or more
employers bid for workers and earn the workers’ (expected) productivity. The employers
in this labor market would know the set Θ, that is, they would know the n payoff functions
of the n workers, but do not know which worker has which payoff function. Employers
would earn an expected payoff of zero.
This is a static game with complete information. The equilibrium concept is Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 1. In any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the revelation game, we have
I∗n ≥ I∗n−1 ≥ ... ≥ I∗2 ≥ I∗1 = 0.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. The proposition formally suggests the
pattern I1 = I2 = ... = 0 < Im = ... = In = 1, 1 < m < n, of equilibrium actions. The
exception is the trivial case where no player reveals, I1 = I2 = ... = In = 0. The trivial
case can be excluded whenever θn − c ≥
∑
j θj/n. That is, the highly productive workers
reveal, and low-productivity workers conceal. See Jovanovic’s (1982) Theorem 1 for a
similar result in a different context.
Definition 1. Let θ¯(s) = 1
s
∑s
i=1 θi. Further, define C =
{
i|θi − c ≤ θ¯(i)
}
and R ={
i|θi − c ≥ θ¯(i)
}
.
In words, θ¯(s) is the average of the productivities of all workers 1, 2, ..., s. The set C
contains all workers whose best-response is to conceal given that all workers with lower
(higher) productivity conceal (reveal). And R is the set of all workers whose best-response
is to reveal given that all workers with lower (higher) productivity conceal (reveal).
Proposition 2. The revelation game has unique pure strategy equilibrium if and only if
max(C) < min(R),
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See the Appendix for a proof. Note that while the games we use in our experiment
all have a unique pure strategy equilibrium, it is easy to construct cases with multiple
equilibria with the help of the proposition. Suppose n = 3, c = 100, θ1 = 200, θ2 = 402
and θ3 = 403. We have θ¯(1) = 200, θ¯(2) = 301 and θ¯(3) = 335. Therefore, C = {1, 3}
and R = {2}. There are multiple equilibria: in one pure strategy Nash equilibrium, all
workers conceal and we have θi − c < 335 for i = 1, 2, 3; in a second pure strategy Nash
equilibrium, workers 2 and 3 reveal and we have θ1 − c < 200, θ2,3 − c > 200+θ2,32 .
4 Experimental Design and Procedures
In our experimental markets, there are n = 6 different workers in a market. We design
three different markets, A, B, and C, with different realizations of Θ. The cost of reve-
lation, c, always equals 100 experimental currency units; it does not vary across workers,
markets or treatments. The different productivities in each market are reported in Table 1.
The entries in bold type indicate that the corresponding subject reveals her productivity
in equilibrium.
The three markets are played on a rotating basis. In period 1 subjects play Market A,
in period 2 they play Market B, and in period 3 Market C is played before they start all
over again with Market A. Each market is played five times, totaling 15 periods altogether.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly allocated into groups
of six, and they stayed in their group for the whole experiment (fixed matching). The
productivities θi, expressed in experimental currency units, were randomly assigned to the
workers in each period. The instructions emphasized that this allocation of productivities
is without replacement such that each productivity value occurs exactly once in each
group and in each period.
Productivity Market A Market B Market C
θ1 200 200 200
θ2 210 448 280
θ3 230 510 360
θ4 260 551 440
θ5 300 582 520
θ6 600 607 600
Table 1: Workers’ productivities in the three different markets. Entries in bold face indicate
that the player reveals in equilibrium (Ii = 1).
The Nash equilibrium for the three markets is as follows. In Market A, only worker
6 reveals her productivity. That is, we have I6 = 1 > I5 = I4 = I3 = I2 = I1 = 0 in
equilibrium. In Market B, all workers except for worker 1 reveal: I6 = I5 = I4 = I3 =
I2 = 1 > I1 = 0. Finally, in Market C, we have I6 = I5 = I4 = 1 > I3 = I2 = I1 = 0.
The motivation for employing Markets A to C is that we need qualitatively different
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equilibrium outcomes to be able to infer whether there is too much or too little revelation.
For example, Market B may show that subjects reveal too little, but given that almost
all workers should reveal in equilibrium, we need to contrast this with Market A where
only one of six workers reveal in Nash equilibrium.
We consider two treatments, one baseline treatment and one control. The control
treatment is identical to the baseline treatment except in one dimension.
1. The baseline treatment, called loaded, is based on the revelation game described
in the previous section with one peculiarity. It employs a loaded labor-market
frame. Subjects are told that they are acting as workers in a labor market. Their
productivity is referred to as their health status, and subjects are told that they
need to decide whether or not to buy a health certificate.
2. In our second treatment, neutral, we remove the labor market frame. The pro-
ductivity is called number and the decision is merely between yes and no. The
neutral treatment is implemented in order to control for the possibility of subjects’
privacy concerns elicited by the framing. If the subjects care for privacy, there
should be more revelation in this treatment compared to the baseline treatment
with the loaded frame.
The feedback given to the participants at the end of a period was as follows. In
all sessions, subjects were informed of their own profits and the market wage of that
period. In 11 groups of the Loaded treatment, we deviated from this and gave additional
information about the choices of all six workers in the group. Our hypothesis was that the
additional feedback supports learning. We do, however, find no impact of the additional
feedback whatsoever (see Section 5.3 for an analysis of learning effects). For most of the
paper, we therefore ignore the differences in feedback in the Loaded treatment and pool
the data.
Loaded Base Loaded Feed Neutral Σ
detailed feedback no yes no
number of participants 72 66 66 204
number of independent groups 12 11 11 34
number of sessions 3 3 3 9
groups per session 4 3-4 3-4
Table 2: Treatments.
The experiment was conducted at the experimental lab at the Technical University
Berlin using the z-Tree software package by Fischbacher (2007) and Greiner’s (2004) online
recruitment system. In total, 204 subjects participated in the experiment, a session lasted
around 60 minutes, and subjects earned between e 8.19 and e 12.51. The average payment
was e 10.70. More details on the number of participants or the independent observations
gathered in this experiment can be found in Table 2.
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5 Results
5.1 Main Findings
This section summarizes the experimental results of the treatments Loaded and Neu-
tral. We will give an overview of the participants’ decisions and show how these deci-
sions relate to the equilibrium predictions. We will also explore the differences between
the treatments Loaded and Neutral. We mainly use non-parametric tests where we
conservatively count each group of six players as one independent observation.
Our main research question is whether and to what extent subjects reveal their pro-
ductivity. Table 3 displays the relevant revelation rates per market, averaged across the
six workers. It turns out that subjects reveal significantly too little compared to the Nash
prediction, except for Market A where observed and predicted behavior are quite similar.
For example, in the Market B of treatment Loaded, subjects reveal in 53.0% of the
cases whereas the prediction is 83.3%. Similar findings result for Market C. In Neutral,
revelation rates are somewhat closer to the prediction but still differ markedly. Using a
sign test, revelation rates are significantly below the prediction in Markets B and C of
both Loaded and Neutral (two-sided tests, all p < 0.05). We refer to this finding as
under-revelation. (We will come back to the higher revelation rates in Neutral and the
apparent exception of Market A.)
Market A
equilibrium Loaded Neutral
reveal 0.167 0.188 0.176
(std. dev.) (0.068) (0.037)
Market B
equilibrium Loaded Neutral
reveal 0.833 0.530 0.618
(std. dev.) (0.155) (0.108)
Market C
equilibrium Loaded Neutral
reveal 0.500 0.361 0.448
(std. dev.) (0.094) (0.062)
Table 3: Revelation rates (market average across all six workers). Standard deviations (in
parenthesis) are calculated using group averages.
Table 4 reports the results of probit regressions (clustered at the group level)11 pro-
viding further statistical support for these observations. The dependent variable, Consis-
tency, indicates whether a subject behaves in line with the Nash prediction. The dummy
11See Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001) for a formal definition of the standard errors in this case.
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variable Reveal indicates the equilibrium action of the corresponding subject (Reveal =
1). The dummy for the treatment with the loaded frame is Loaded and Period captures
possible time trends. The dummy variables Market A and Market B represent depar-
tures from the (baseline) Market C in the regression. Considering the different markets,
the regressions confirm that there are more equilibrium choices in Market A and fewer
equilibrium choices in Market B compared to Market C.
(1) (2) (3)
Reveal -0.911*** -0.786*** -0.786***
(0.0962) (0.149) (0.149)
Loaded -0.370*** -0.248 -0.196
(0.130) (0.194) (0.215)
Reveal×Loaded -0.167 -0.167
(0.205) (0.205)
Market A 0.226*** 0.224*** 0.224***
(0.0760) (0.0762) (0.0762)
Market B -0.210*** -0.212*** -0.212***
(0.0504) (0.0507) (0.0507)
Period 0.0647*** 0.0651*** 0.0781**
(0.0177) (0.0180) (0.0373)
Period×Loaded -0.0179
(0.0425)
Constant 1.606*** 1.513*** 1.475***
(0.128) (0.159) (0.182)
Observations 3,060 3,060 3,060
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.145 0.145
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 4: Probit regression results on the equilibrium consistency of choices.
Observation 1. In Markets B and C of treatments Loaded and Neutral, we observe
significantly fewer revelation decisions than predicted.
There is a striking difference between the frequency of out-of-equilibrium revelation
and concealment decisions. In the Loaded treatment, workers conceal when the equilib-
rium calls for revelation in 16%, 38%, and 33% of all decisions in Markets A, B and C,
respectively; the corresponding frequencies for workers who reveal when the equilibrium
predicts concealment are only 6%, 10%, and 6%. This difference is highly significant
for all three markets (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001). In Neutral
these figures read 11%, 26%, and 16% (if the prediction is to reveal) and 3%, 0%, and
5% (for workers with a prediction to conceal) and the difference is also significant (two-
sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.003). The regressions in Table 4 confirm that
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Reveal has a highly significant negative influence on the likelihood of subjects choosing
the equilibrium action.
Observation 2. In both Loaded and Neutral, workers who reveal in equilibrium
violate the prediction significantly more often than workers who conceal in equilibrium.
Note that this second observation qualifies the finding that revelation rates in Market
A are equal to the prediction at the market level. Indeed, the revelation rates of Market
A in Table 3 mask the fact that the single worker who is supposed to reveal in equilibrium
fails to take the equilibrium decision about three times as often as the five workers who
should not reveal in equilibrium on average. That is, we have far more out-of-equilibrium
concealment compared to out-of-equilibrium revelation also in Market A.
We further break down behavior for the different productivities. Table 5 summarizes
the equilibrium prediction and actual play for all workers in the three markets. Consider
workers who are expected to reveal in equilibrium, denoted by the entry of 1 in the “Nash”
row. The differences between actual revelation rates and predictions are major, ranging
from from 15% up to 68% in Loaded. The table shows that these inconsistencies with
equilibrium play are positively correlated with worker productivity for those workers who
should reveal in equilibrium.12 In contrast, inconsistencies with equilibrium play are not
correlated with productivity when workers should conceal in equilibrium, and they are
also generally small.13 In Neutral, the under-revelation result is less pronounced, and
again the same correlation for out-of-equilibrium conceal decisions can be found but there
is no correlation for out-of-equilibrium reveal decisions.
Worker 1 2 3 4 5 6
Market A
Nash 0 0 0 0 0 1
Loaded 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.84
Neutral 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.89
Market B
Nash 0 1 1 1 1 1
Loaded 0.10 0.32 0.44 0.65 0.81 0.85
Neutral 0 0.35 0.71 0.78 0.91 0.96
Market C
Nash 0 0 0 1 1 1
Loaded 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.41 0.77 0.83
Neutral 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.62 0.93 0.98
Table 5: Average revelation rates across markets and treatments. An entry of 0 denotes that
the worker is predicted to conceal while 1 denotes that the worker is predicted to reveal.
12A sign test (two-sided) on the sign of Spearman’s ρ calculated for each group yields p ≤ 0.001 for both,
Loaded and Neutral.
13A sign test (two-sided) on the sign of Spearman’s ρ calculated for each group yields p = 0.455 for Loaded
and p = 0.508 for Neutral.
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Observation 3. In both Loaded and Neutral, choices inconsistent with the equilib-
rium prediction are correlated with productivity when workers should reveal but not when
they should conceal.
5.2 Framing Effect
As is apparent from the results reported above, subjects in the Neutral treatment reveal
more often than in Loaded. We observe differences in three dimensions:
– When averaging across workers (Table 3), revelation rates are higher in Neutral
than in Loaded for Markets B and C, although this is only significant in Market
C (two-sided Mann-Whitney U-Tests, Market C: p = 0.008; Market B: p = 0.132).
– We find that more decisions are in line with the equilibrium prediction in Neutral
than with the loaded frame. In Loaded, 79.8% of the decisions are consistent
compared to 87.8% in Neutral. This difference is significant (two-sided Mann-
Whitney U-Test, p = 0.027).
– The higher level of equilibrium play in Neutral has a distinct pattern: there are
more equilibrium revelation choices, but not more equilibrium conceal decisions in
Neutral compared to Loaded. Averaging across the three markets in Loaded,
we observe 34.2% conceal decisions of workers who should reveal in equilibrium and
6.2% reveal decisions for workers who should conceal in equilibrium. For Neutral,
the corresponding numbers are 20.8% and 3.6%. The decrease from 34.2% to 20.8%
is significant (two-sided Mann-Whitney U-Test, p = 0.024) but the decrease from
6.2% to 3.6% is not (two-sided Mann-Whitney U-Test, p = 0.356).
The regression analysis in Table 4 supports these findings. Loaded leads to less equilib-
rium choices than the baseline treatment Neutral, as expected. Adding the interaction
Reveal×Loaded suggests that decisions in Loaded are less likely to be consistent with
the equilibrium only when they concern reveal decisions, as argued above: in regressions
(2) and (3) of in Table 4, Loaded is insignificant but Loaded together with the interaction
term Reveal×Loaded is significant at the 5% level (Wald tests, in regression (2) p = 0.012,
and p = 0.022 in (3)).
Observation 4. In Neutral, subjects reveal their productivity more often than in
Loaded. While there are significantly more choices consistent with equilibrium in Neu-
tral, this effect is quantitatively and statistically significant only for workers who should
reveal in equilibrium.
These findings suggest that the labor market frame in combination with the health
certificate affects choices. It gives rise to preferences not restricted to the monetary incen-
tives of the game. A share of subjects were more reluctant to disclose their productivity
12
in the loaded treatment where private information concerned the subject’s health sta-
tus. Hence, revelation of private information increases or decreases depending on the
contextual frame, without any real privacy issues at stake in the experiment.
5.3 Learning and Feedback
We now check whether subjects learn to play the equilibrium over time and whether
detailed feedback accelerates learning. As mentioned, we have employed two different
feedback formats in the Loaded, Loaded Base and Loaded Feed treatments. In
Loaded Base subjects were only informed about their own profits and about the market
wage of that period. In Loaded Feed subjects received additional information about
the revelation decisions of all six workers in the group.
Figure 1 shows the frequency of choices consistent with equilibrium over time. (We
aggregate across markets because their time trends are virtually identical.) There is an
increase in equilibrium decisions in all three treatments, Loaded Base, Loaded Feed
and Neutral. Overall, however, learning effects appear to be only modest in this game.
Equilibrium consistency increases by about 5 to 8 percentage points. In contrast, choices
observed in beauty contest games with similar group sizes quickly converge to the Nash
equilibrium (see Nagel (1995)).14
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Figure 1: Fraction of equilibrium-consistent decisions across treatments over time.
14It may appear that, in Neutral, the overall rate of equilibrium consistent choices is reasonably high
toward the end. Note, however, that this average includes all markets and all workers, and in Market A
only one worker is supposed to reveal. As seen above, the rate of equilibrium inconsistency can be rather
high for some markets and some workers. So the average error rate reported here suggests a substantial
share of non-equilibrium decisions for some workers.
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The results from the two variants Loaded Base and Loaded Feed are very simi-
lar. Regarding the consistency of choices with the equilibrium predictions, we find that
78.9% and 80.9% of the decisions are consistent in Loaded Base and Loaded Feed,
respectively. The difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.558). The measures
for under- and over-revelation with respect to the equilibrium predictions are also hardly
distinguishable. About one-third of the decisions, 35.3% in Loaded Base and 32.9% in
Loaded Feed, are classified as under-revelation while the numbers for over-revelation
are 6.9% and 5.5% in Loaded Base and Loaded Feed, respectively. Neither under-
nor over-revelation varies significantly across these two treatments, with corresponding p-
values of 0.758 and 0.685. We also compared decisions between the two different feedback
formats per market and per period but did not find any significant differences.
Finally, in the regressions reported in Table 4 the positive coefficient of Period shows
that time positively influences the equilibrium play of the subjects. The effect is moderate
and does not vary across treatments as the interaction term between Period and Loaded
incorporated in regression (3) is insignificant. A test for joint significance between Period
and this interaction is also insignificant (p = 0.429). Hence, we infer that there are no
differences concerning learning between Loaded and in Neutral.
The findings in this section suggest that learning is difficult in the revelation game.
From this we take that under-revelation is a robust phenomenon, not simply a mistake
that subjects commit only once in a while. Nevertheless, let us note that while our
focus has been on deviations from the equilibrium predictions, this is not to say that
subjects’ behavior is grotesquely inconsistent with the predictions. However, we believe
it is important to investigate systematic deviations from equilibrium in order to better
understand behavior in the context of voluntary information revelation and privacy.
6 Explaining under-revelation
In this section, we discuss explanations for the under-revelation results of Observations
1 to 3. We consider (i) level-k reasoning, (ii) quantal response equilibrium, and (iii)
inequality aversion in the next subsections.15 As none of the models can explain the
observed framing effect, we focus on the treatment Neutral, keeping in mind that the
data in Loaded reveal even less disclosure of private information.
6.1 Level-k reasoning
To analyze our game with level-k reasoning, we assume that level-0 players randomize
with probability 0.5 between their two actions, although the exact level-0 assumption
15We can dismiss risk aversion as a possible explanation for the under-revelation results. Risk aversion
would predict the opposite behavior because revealing one’s productivity guarantees a certain payoff
whereas not revealing it causes a payoff that is uncertain.
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does not matter much qualitatively for our game.16 We then calculate the best replies for
k > 1 where level-k′, k′ > 0 players believe that all other players reason at level k = k′−1.
Table 6 displays the required levels of reasoning for players to pick their equilibrium
action in the various markets for different productivities. The fewest iterations are re-
quired in Market A. The highest level-k requirement occurs in Market B for player 2
who has to perform five steps of reasoning. We note that level-k reasoning yields Nash
equilibrium choices for a finite number of steps.
Productivity Market A Market B Market C
θ1 200
k≥1 200k≥1 200k≥1
θ2 210
k≥1 448k≥5 280k≥1
θ3 230
k≥1 510k≥4 360k≥1
θ4 260
k≥1 551k≥3 440k≥3
θ5 300
k≥1 582k≥2 520k≥2
θ6 600
k≥1 607k≥1 600k≥1
Table 6: Minimum k-level required for a player to choose her equilibrium action. Productivities
in bold face indicate that this worker reveals in equilibrium.
Importantly, Table 6 also shows that taking the (equilibrium) decision to conceal
merely requires level-1 throughout. By contrast, revealing may require up to k = n − 1
levels. As this property is central to our research question, we prove this generally.
Proposition 3. Within the level-k model, workers who conceal if they are of type k > 1
also conceal if they a level-1 type.
The proof can be found in the appendix. The proposition suggests that concealing
already occurs for the lowest level of reasoning (k = 1): it is not possible, for example,
that a worker reveals when she is a level-1 type but conceals when she is level-2.
The level-k patterns in Table 6 offer an explanation of Observations 1 to 3. The
reason is that, as seen in Proposition 3, the revelation game requires increasingly higher
levels of reasoning for the equilibrium decision to reveal, but only level-1 reasoning for
equilibrium decisions to conceal. Under the assumption that at least some players display
limited depth of reasoning, this implies (i) disproportionally more concealment in general,
(ii) more consistency with the equilibrium prediction for workers who conceal than for
those who reveal in equilibrium, and (iii) a negative correlation of equilibrium revelation
decisions with productivities which does not hold for equilibrium conceal decisions.
16A different yet plausible assumption for level-0 types is that all workers conceal with probability one. In
that case, it is straightforward to check that Markets A and B remain as in Table 6, but, in Market C,
also worker 5 reveals when k = 1 and worker 4 when k = 2. Less plausible, in our view, is the level-0
assumption that all workers reveal with probability one. If so, the prediction is the same as when all
workers conceal with probability one with all k-levels augmented by one. The logic is that when all
players reveal, the k = 1 reply for all workers is to conceal with probability one.
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More specifically, the level-k model predicts that the frequency of conceal decisions
should be equal to the frequency of reveal decisions by worker 6 in all three markets
because all of these decisions require at least level-1 reasoning. We find support for
this hypothesis in Neutral where we observe no significant differences in the fraction of
equilibrium choices by those players (two-sided Wilcoxon matched pairs test, p = 0.153).17
(4) (5) (6)
Consistency Consistency Consistency
Min k -0.498*** -0.459*** -0.470***
(0.0326) (0.0339) (0.0692)
Reveal -0.443*** -0.444***
(0.106) (0.105)
Loaded -0.421*** -0.457*
(0.148) (0.251)
Market A 0.0667 0.0670
(0.0795) (0.0799)
Market B 0.249*** 0.249***
(0.0564) (0.0571)
Period 0.0744*** 0.0744***
(0.0200) (0.0200)
Loaded×Min k 0.0155
(0.0780)
Constant 1.932*** 2.102*** 2.129***
(0.0977) (0.161) (0.227)
Observations 3,060 3,060 3,060
Pseudo R2 0.197 0.228 0.228
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 7: Probit regression results on the equilibrium consistency of choices.
The relevance of level-k reasoning can also be taken from the regression analysis sum-
marized in Table 7 (the data are again clustered at the group level). In these regressions
we consider the cardinal variable Min k, defined as the minimum k-level required for an
individual worker to choose her equilibrium action. This variable is highly significant in
all regressions. That higher requirements on subjects’ reasoning lower the likelihood for
equilibrium play appears to have strong explanatory power. From column (5) it can be
taken that adding the variables of the regressions in Table 4 hardly affects the coefficient
of the minimum k-level required. In addition, we find that the variable Min k fully ex-
plains the difference between the baseline Market C and Market A. The dummy variable
Market B now has a positive influence on equilibrium play relative to Market C. Hence,
17In Loaded, there is more under-revelation by worker 6 than over-revelation by those workers who conceal
in equilibrium. This can be attributed to the framing effect causing lower revelation rates.
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the different behavior observed in the three markets is mainly a result of the different
cognitive challenges of these markets.
The level-k model delivers an intuitive explanation for the behavioral patterns we
observe in the experiments. As low-productivity workers with a prediction to reveal need
to anticipate other workers’ behavior much more accurately, their decisions are more
challenging compared to high-productivity workers who should conceal. It follows that
these low-productivity workers are more prone to making decisions that are inconsistent
with the equilibrium and, consequently, there should be more under-revelation than over-
revelation.
6.2 Quantal Response Equilibrium
Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), developed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), is
another candidate for the analysis of deviations from standard Nash equilibrium. QRE is a
generalization of Nash equilibrium that takes decision errors into account: workers do not
always choose the best response with probability one but they choose better alternatives
more frequently than others. Therefore, QRE allows for out-of-equilibrium choices to
conceal and reveal one’s productivity.
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Figure 2: QRE predictions for Market B.
We employ the logit equilibrium variant of QRE. Worker i believes that the other
workers will choose to reveal with certain belief probabilities and calculates her expected
payoff from concealing based on this belief (the payoff from revealing is simply the pro-
ductivity minus the revelation cost). Workers make better choices more frequently. In
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particular, choice probabilities are specified to be ratios of exponential functions where
expected payoffs are multiplied with λ, the rationality parameter. This parameter cap-
tures deviations from the Nash equilibrium: if λ = 0, behavior is completely noisy and
both choices are equally likely regardless of their expected payoff; as λ → ∞, workers
choose the best response with probability one. In the logit equilibrium, beliefs and choice
probabilities are consistent.
As an example, Figure 2 displays the QRE predictions (revelation frequencies given
the rationality parameter λ) for Market B. We note that QRE can explain the under-
revelation result: for any λ > 0, the error probabilities are higher for workers 2 to 6 who
reveal in equilibrium than for worker 1, suggesting too little revelation. The relationship
between the probability of revealing and λ is even non-monotonic for some workers, so
a higher λ can be associated with less revelation. The intuition is that the likelihood
that worker 6 reveals must meet a certain threshold before other workers start preferring
revelation over concealment. Thus, λ must be high enough. On the other hand, the
higher the parameter λ, the more weight the best response gets such that the propensity
to conceal can increase in λ as long as worker 6 does not reveal with a significantly high
probability. Such a non-monotonicity cannot be observed for workers that should conceal
in equilibrium in any of our markets. Qualitatively, Market C looks the same as Figure 2.
In Market A, there are no non-monotonicities since all workers except worker 1 conceal
in equilibrium.
We conduct a maximum-likelihood estimation of the QRE parameter λ for the treat-
ment Neutral. Following Haile, Hortac¸su and Kosenok (2008), the estimation is im-
plemented jointly for our three markets such that there is only one free parameter in the
model we estimate. We find an estimate of λ = 0.035 with a standard error of 0.0015,
suggesting that λ significantly differs from zero.18
Table 8 summarizes the QRE prediction for the λ we estimated from the data and
contrasts this prediction with our findings. Overall, QRE fits the data well. It correctly
predicts the degree of under-revelation (of workers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Market B; and
workers 4, 5, and 6 in Market C). The predicted and observed frequencies of revelation
are remarkably similar. Also, the low revelation frequencies of low-productivity workers
who should conceal in equilibrium are predicted rather well (workers 1, 2, and 3 in Market
A; and workers 1 and 2 in Market C). On the other hand, the QRE predictions for
some of the workers who conceal in equilibrium do not perform as well. QRE predicts
substantial rates of out-of-equilibrium revelation decisions with about 20% for worker 5
in Market A and for worker 3 in Market C. In both cases, less than 10% revelation is
observed. Nevertheless, the QRE model captures the overall patterns of behavior well
and can therefore account for the lower revelation rates that we observed compared to
the equilibrium.
18Separate estimates for the three markets yield λA = 0.026, λB = 0.039 and λC = 0.029. The QRE
estimate for the three markets in Loaded is λ = 0.017
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Worker 1 2 3 4 5 6
Market A
Nash 0 0 0 0 0 1
QRE <0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.20 >0.99
Neutral data 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.89
Market B
Nash 0 1 1 1 1 1
QRE <0.01 0.27 0.60 0.78 0.87 0.92
Neutral data 0.00 0.35 0.71 0.78 0.91 0.96
Market C
Nash 0 0 0 1 1 1
QRE <0.01 0.02 0.21 0.67 0.93 0.99
Neutral data 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.62 0.93 0.98
Table 8: QRE estimates and data from Neutral
6.3 Inequality aversion
Does fairness prevent the revelation of private information? In our game, when the highest
productivity worker chooses to reveal it increases her own payoff but imposes a negative
externality on others.19 Similarly, given the best worker reveals, the same can hold true for
the second most productive worker. Accordingly, inequality-averse subjects may be less
inclined to reveal their productivity than the standard model of selfish payoff maximizers
suggests. While such motives may play only a minor role in large markets like the labor
market, they may be important in smaller groups (small teams or enterprises) and in our
experimental groups of six.
We use the model of inequality aversion proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (hence-
forth F&S) where players are concerned not only about their own material payoff but also
about the difference between their own payoff and other players’ payoffs. As a consequence
the players’ utility is
Ui(xi, xj) = xi − αi
n− 1 max[xj − xi, 0]−
βi
n− 1 max[xi − xj, 0] (1)
where, xi and xj denote the monetary payoffs to players i and j, and αi and βi denote i’s
aversion toward disadvantageous inequality (envy) and advantageous inequality (greed),
respectively. Standard preferences occur for α = β = 0. Following F&S, we assume
0 ≤ βi < 1.
There are two complications regarding the impact of inequality aversion. One issue is
that the effect on inequality of (not) revealing one’s productivity will often be ambiguous:
a worker may find that concealing reduces the advantageous inequality with respect to less
19As an example, consider Market A. The Nash equilibrium has only worker 6 revealing her productivity,
and worker 6 earns 500 points in equilibrium whereas all others earn 240 points. If worker 6 did not reveal,
everybody would earn 300 points. It follows that, for a sufficiently inequality-averse subject, concealing
may yield a higher utility than revealing.
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productive workers but it may also increase the payoff difference to the more productive
workers provided they reveal. So this worker may stick with her (standard) equilibrium
action even if she is inequality averse. Another complication is that there are multiple
equilibria. It is not straightforward to show which of the 26 = 64 possible outcomes can
be an equilibrium for inequality-averse players and which cannot.
To tackle these issues we employ simulations based on a calibrated version of the
model to identify the F&S equilibria of the revelation game. The model is calibrated
using the joint distribution of the α and β parameters observed in Blanco, Engelmann
and Normann (2011). For each subject, they derive an αi from rejection behavior in the
ultimatum game and a βi from a modified dictator game. There are 61 subjects in this
data set with 58 different αi-βi types.
20 Note that we need the joint distribution of the
parameters, which is unavailable elsewhere. The computer simulations are implemented
as follows: In each trial, the program randomly assigns an αi-βi parameter combination
to each of the six workers (with replacement), where the 61 αi-βi types in the Blanco
et al. (2011) data were equally likely. Given the realization of inequality parameters, the
program then systematically checks which of the 64 possible outcomes turns out to be an
equilibrium. Note that there can be multiple equilibria, which is also the reason why the
percentages do not add up to 100%. For the three markets A, B, and C separately, we
ran 100,000 trials.
Actions of workers Market
No. I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 A B C
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 – 90.5% –
2 0 0 1 1 1 1 – 3.9% –
3 0 0 0 1 1 1 – 7.2% 61.9%
4 0 0 0 0 1 1 – 9.5% 20.2%
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 80.3% 14.8% 17.0%
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 19.7% 55.6% 8.4%
7 0 0 0 0 1 0 – – 5.2%
Table 9: Summary of F&S equilibria. Note: because of multiple equilibria, the figures do not
always add up to one hundred percent.
The simulation results are summarized in Table 9 which can be read as follows. First,
note that seven equilibria emerge out of the 64 possible outcomes where each is described
in a separate row of the table. In equilibrium 1, only worker 1 chooses to conceal while
all the other workers reveal. This strategy profile was an F&S equilibrium in 90.5% of the
100,000 simulations of Market B where it is also the standard Nash equilibrium. There
appear to be no F&S parameters which support this outcome as an equilibrium for Market
A or C.
20There are no significant differences between the distributions of α that Blanco et al. (2011) elicit and
the one assumed in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The distributions of β differ, but they are still roughly
comparable.
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Overall, inequality aversion is consistent with our under-revelation result. The sim-
ulations show that there are equilibria with F&S preferences where fewer players reveal
than in a standard Nash equilibrium, and there are no F&S equilibria where more players
reveal than in a Nash equilibrium.
Having said that, there are some aspects of the simulations that show the limits
of inequality aversion for rationalizing our data. Firstly, and perhaps surprisingly, the
standard Nash equilibrium is very often also an equilibrium with F&S preferences. In all
three markets, it is the most frequent equilibrium: 90.5% (Market B), 80.3% (Market A)
and 61.9% (Market C) of the 100,000 random realizations of αi-βi parameter combinations.
Relatedly, the F&S equilibria consistent with our data occur with rather low frequencies.
In other words, there are only a few F&S parameter combinations that support these
equilibria. For instance, in Market B, we observe especially minimal revelation by workers
2 and 3 which may be captured by the F&S equilibria numbered 2 and 3. However, these
equilibria do not occur often in the simulations. Moreover, the calibrated F&S model
predicts that there is an equilibrium in which no worker reveals (equilibrium 6), and this
equilibrium occurs in more than 50% of the runs for Market B where we in fact observe
a lot of revelation, in line with the equilibrium prediction.
Secondly, the simulations show that coordination problems may occur due to multiple
equilibria. In Market B there is a unique equilibrium in 26.6% of the cases, two equilibria
in 65.5%, and three equilibria in 7.9% of the cases. The corresponding values for Market
C are 87.3% and 12.7% for one or two equilibria, respectively. It is unclear how inequality-
averse players can resolve the coordination problems resulting from multiple equilibria.
In Market A, we always found a unique equilibrium, but this market is not strongly
supportive of inequality aversion either. The equilibrium for Market A can be found
analytically: worker 6 will not reveal if and only if βi > 200/260 ≈ 0.8. This condition
will be met for 20% in the data set of Blanco et al. (2011) (and our simulations indicate
exactly the same frequency for the occurrence of this equilibrium). In Neutral this
equilibrium occurs, however, only with a frequency of 11%. While the loaded frame
leads to results closer to the prediction, inequality aversion should not be driven by the
frame. Overall, we can explain the observed outcomes as equilibria when players have
F&S preferences. Thus, inequality aversion can account for the under-revelation observed
in our revelation game experiment.
6.4 Discussion
Our goal in this section has been to show how three different behavioral models all predict
that less unraveling than in the standard Nash equilibrium will occur. The three canonical
behavioral models discussed all suggest that there are systematic reasons for players not to
reveal. By contrast, we found hardly any support for a hypothesis suggesting that players
reveal too much as compared to the equilibrium. This, together with the experimental
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evidence, implies a strong behavioral prediction that less unravelling occurs in real markets
than predicted with fully rational and selfish players.
The analysis is not aimed at conducting a horse race among behavioral models to
find out which of them best explains the data. Nevertheless, we believe that level-k or a
limited depth of reasoning is a prime and parsimonious model for explaining our data. The
privacy debate about the voluntary revelation of private information literally makes use
of steps of reasoning when discussing unraveling (given some people reveal, more workers
will do so, and so on). Level-k reasoning leads to two clear-cut propositions suggesting
under-revelation: equilibrium concealment only requires k = 1 whereas revelation may
require higher levels of reasoning. When higher levels of reasoning are increasingly rare
among subjects, it follows for our setup that there is generally too little revelation; the
lower the worker’s productivity, the less likely the worker will reveal if the equilibrium
calls for revelation; and there are virtually no equilibrium-inconsistent reveal decisions.
This is what we see in the data.
With QRE, the frequency of the decision errors depends on the payoff magnitude of the
decisions to reveal and to conceal and on the rationality parameter. QRE suggests that the
payoff from concealing will, all else being equal, become more attractive than the payoff
from revealing for workers with low productivity.21 It follows that the (expected) payoff
differences between concealing and revealing are small for workers with low productivity.
Even when the equilibrium calls for revelation, QRE suggests (at least for the parameters
we estimate) that a sizeable share of decisions will be mistaken. Boundedly rational players
will therefore often fail to reveal but will rarely fail to conceal. The distribution suggested
by QRE fits quantitatively well with the data, however, we note that this distribution is
derived from a parameter estimated with our data. By contrast, with inequality aversion
we used previous experiments for a comparison to our data and level-k reasoning produces
only qualitative predictions. One aspect QRE does not capture well is that it also predicts
substantial rates of out-of-equilibrium revelation decisions which, however, rarely occur
in the data. In contrast, according to the level-k model only level-0 players may or may
not conceal when the equilibrium calls for revelation. As a consequence, level-k does not
predict an out-of-equilibrium revelation to be correlated with the worker’s productivity
which appears to be more in line with our data.
In different manners level-k and QRE take into account that the payoff from concealing
will ceteris paribus become more attractive than the payoff from revealing, θi − c, for
workers with low θ. It requires a “high level of rationality” (high k or high λ) for unraveling
21In fact, due to the deviations from equilibrium in Markets B and C, for some players it is no longer a
standard best reply to choose their equilibrium action given the choices of the other players. In these
cases, deviating from the equilibrium choice is ex-post payoff maximizing. In particular, we find that in
Market B workers 2 and 3 earn on average 407 and 431 points if they conceal, respectively, which is more
profitable compared to the 348 and 410 points they earn if they reveal. In Market C only worker 4 should
deviate from the equilibrium and conceal, thereby earning on average 342 points compared to 340 points
after revelation. Note that payoff differences are small, however, so for moderate λ parameters QRE will
suggest that both actions should be played frequently.
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to occur to the extent predicted in equilibrium. Thus, both models suggest that the
unraveling process might be stuck after a few players, leading to less revelation.
Markets played by fully rational yet inequality-averse players may also unravel only in-
completely. The negative externality imposed on others may make even high-productivity
workers conceal. On the other hand, inequality aversion supports the Nash equilibrium
with standard preferences. Another difficulty is that multiple equilibria occur, which
reduces the predictive power of such preferences. However, in small groups of players,
perhaps non-binding communication may enable players to coordinate on equilibria with
very little revelation.
7 Conclusion
We study experimental labor markets where workers have private information about their
productivity which they can perfectly reveal at a cost. Whereas standard Nash equi-
librium predicts unraveling and the disclosure of private information, we observe that
workers do so less often than predicted. The propensity to conceal when the equilib-
rium calls for revelation is in stark contrast to the low frequency of decisions inconsistent
with equilibrium when a worker should conceal. These findings are robust across both
treatments we conducted.
Three behavioral models suggest the incomplete unraveling we observe: level-k reason-
ing, quantal-response equilibrium, and inequality aversion, although for different reasons.
Level-k reasoning and quantal-response equilibrium predict that boundedly rational play-
ers will conceal frequently, and only with fully rational players will there be complete
unraveling. Out-of-equilibrium revelation, by contrast, will be rare as concealing in equi-
librium does not require more than one step of reasoning (level-1 type). Inequality-averse
players may be reluctant to reveal when it increases payoff differences.
With the help of a treatment using a neutral frame we also identify a framing effect.
When the wording suggests that the information to be disclosed is particularly sensitive
subjects reveal significantly less frequently compared to the neutral frame. We believe
that this framing effect is driven by subjects’ privacy concerns, and that subjects have a
taste for privacy per se.
The implications of our results for policy are as follows. Revelation costs are detri-
mental to welfare and hence under-revelation has a direct positive effect on welfare. In
our setting, there are no benefits from sorting workers, so the higher level of concealment
we observe improves welfare. That subjects reveal less than in the equilibrium benchmark
can also be seen as desirable from the point of view of protecting privacy: if the unrav-
eling argument is worrisome because it suggests that the protection of personal data is
futile, limits to unraveling are a welcome counterforce. However, while our experiments
show that the unraveling of private information is less severe than predicted with fully
rational and selfish players, the overall level of information revelation is non-negligible
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and some unraveling can be observed. We therefore believe that the debate about how to
limit the externalities of voluntary disclosure and how to regulate information disclosure
is relevant, even though unraveling processes may be more sluggish or may stop earlier
than the standard model predicts.
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. We first show that I∗1 = 0. By concealing, the lowest productivity worker 1 earns
at least θ1 (namely when all other workers reveal, otherwise more), but worker 1 earns
θ1− c < θ1 by revealing. Hence, concealing is strictly dominant for worker 1 and we have
I∗1 = 0 in equilibrium.
Next, we prove that I∗i = 0 ∧ I∗j = 1 only if θi < θj strictly. Consider an equilibrium
outcome with I∗i = 0 and I
∗
j = 1 and denote θ
′ =
∑
m6=i,j(1− Im)θm and I ′ =
∑
m6=i,j(1−
Im). Now I
∗
i = 0 and I
∗
j = 1 are best replies to action profile I
′ if and only if
θi − c ≤ θi + θ
′
1 + I ′
(2)
θj − c ≥ θi + θj + θ
′
2 + I ′
(3)
where the inequality for player i follows from Ii = 0 and the inequality for j follows from
Ij = 1. Solving both equations for θ
′, we obtain
− c+ (θi − c)I ′ ≤ θ′ ≤ θj − θi − 2c+ (θj − c)I ′ (4)
and
0 ≤ −c+ (θj − θi)(1 + I ′) (5)
which holds only if θi < θj strictly. Since I
∗
i = 0 < 1 = I
∗
j only if θi < θj, we cannot have
I∗i+1 < I
∗
i and thus I
∗
n ≥ I∗n−1 ≥ ...I∗2 ≥ I∗1 as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. We first show that, if min(R) > max(C) as asserted in the proposition, we get a
unique equilibrium. Assume that, say, R = {n, n−1, ...,m} and C = {m−1,m−2, ..., 1}.
Then the pure strategy action profile
1 = I∗n = I
∗
n−1 = ... = I
∗
m > I
∗
m−1 = ... = I
∗
2 = I
∗
1 = 0
is a Nash equilibrium by the definition of R and C.
Now consider another pure strategy equilibrium candidate where, from Proposition 1,
we only need to consider outcomes where I∗n ≥ I∗n−1 ≥ ... ≥ I∗2 ≥ I∗1 = 0. Assume first
that more workers reveal in this equilibrium candidate than in the first equilibrium, that
is, workers m−1 to m−k, k ≥ 1, reveal in this alleged equilibrium (whereas they conceal
28
in the first equilibrium):
1 = I∗n = I
∗
n−1 = ... = I
∗
m = I
∗
m−1 = ... = I
∗
m−k > I
∗
m−k−1 = ... = I
∗
2 = I
∗
1 = 0
For this to be a Nash equilibrium, we necessarily need θm−k−c ≥ 1m−k
∑m−k
j=1 θj. However,
this requires that m−k ∈ R which is a violation of min(R) > max(C). Consider a different
pure strategy equilibrium candidate and where fewer workers reveal; say, workers m to
m+ k, k ≥ 0 conceal (whereas they reveal in the first equilibrium). Here, we necessarily
need θm+k−c ≤ 1m+k
∑m+k
j=1 θj for this outcome to be a Nash equilibrium. Hence, m+k ∈ C
which violates the assumption in the proposition. Hence, if min(R) > max(C), the first
Nash equilibrium is the unique pure strategy equilibrium.
We now show the “only if” part of the proposition by proving that, if min(R) >
max(C) is violated, we get multiple equilibria. Let m be the highest worker in C and l be
the lowest worker in R and assume the violation: m > l. First, note thatm ∈ C iff θm−c ≤
θ¯(m) which, implies that concealment is a best-response for the workers 1, ...,m given that
the remaining workers reveal. From m = max(C) it follows that θm+1 − c > θm+1+
∑m
j=1 θj
m+1
and, by the definition of m, the inequality will also hold for all workers m+1, ..., n. Hence,
we have a Nash equilibrium where the workers 1, ...,m conceal and the workers m+1, ..., n
reveal. Second, note that l = min(R) implies θl−1− c < θl−1+
∑m−2
j=1 θj
l−1 , that is, concealment
is a best-response for the workers 1, ..., l − 1 given that the remaining workers reveal. As
for the remaining workers, l ∈ R implies θl − c ≥ θl+
∑l−1
j=1 θj
l
and the same inequality will
hold for all workers l, ..., n. Hence we have a second Nash equilibrium where the workers
1, ..., l− 1 conceal and the workers l, ..., n reveal. Hence, if min(R) > max(C) is violated,
multiple equilibria occur and the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. We prove the proposition by establishing a contradiction: suppose some worker
conceals for k = 2 but reveals for k = 1. This yields a contradiction because, as we will
show, the expected payoff from concealing is higher if k = 1 than if k = 2.
We first derive the best reply of a k = 1 player. Player i (when k = 1) believes that all
other players randomize across both actions with a probability of 0.50. To calculate the
payoff from concealing, player i needs to take into account all possible contingencies that
may arise (no other player concealing, one of the n − 1 other players concealing and so
on) which yields a complex combinatoric expression. Specifically, player i (when k = 1)
will reveal if and only if
θi − c ≥
θi
∑n−1
a=0
(n−1a )
a+1
+ (
∑
j 6=i θj)(
∑n−1
a=1
(n−2a−1)
a+1
)
2n−1
(6)
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or
θi − c ≥
θi
∑n−2
a=0
(n−2a )
a+1
+ (
∑
j∈I θj)(
∑n−1
a=1
(n−2a−1)
a+1
)
2n−1
(7)
where the numerator arises because all possibilities occur with equal probability.
Note that, if (7) is met for player i, it will also be met for all workers with θj ≥ θi.
This follows from the observation that the factor of θi on the RHS of (7) is strictly smaller
than one. Hence (when k = 1), workers θ1, ..., θm will conceal and workers θm+1, ..., θn will
reveal for some m ≥ 1, unless we have the trivial case where all workers conceal.
As a next step, we show that a necessary condition for worker i to reveal (when k = 1)
is θi >
∑n
j=1 θj
n
. To prove this, we evaluate RHS of (7) when θi =
1
n
∑n
j=1 θj. Simple but
tedious combinatorics show a rather intuitive result, namely that this expression is greater
or equal than the average worker productivity if and only if θi ≥ 1n
∑n
j=1 θj. Thus, (7)
will be met only if worker i’s productivity is above average.
We now establish the fact that the condition for a k = 2 worker to conceal is weaker
than the condition for a k = 1 worker to conceal. When k = 2, worker i believes that
all other players are level k = 1, and, accordingly, that {θ1, θ2, ...θm} will conceal with
probability one. Player i will conceal (when k = 2) if and only if
θi − c ≤ θi +
∑m
i=1 θj
m+ 1
. (8)
Now, for worker i to reveal when k = 1 necessarily requires θi − c ≥ 1n
∑n
j=1 θj but to
conceal when k = 2 requires (8). Putting these condition together, we obtain
θi +
∑m
i=1 θj
m+ 1
≥ θi − c >
∑n
i=1 θj
n
. (9)
This, however, cannot hold: it cannot be that the average of the low-productivity workers
1, ...,m plus worker i is larger than the average productivity of all workers because θi >∑
j θj/n for all i > m.
Since the condition for revealing as a k = 1 player contradicts the condition for
concealing as a k = 2 player, it cannot be that player i reveals as a level k = 1 but but
conceals as level k = 2. Hence, if player i conceals for k = 2, she will do so with k = 1
steps of reasoning.
Finally and intuitively, similar arguments show that a worker will conceal if k = 2 if
she conceals when k = 3 and so on for a higher k. With a higher k, high types will “drop
out” by revealing, leading to even lower concealment wages. Hence, workers who conceal
for some k′ will not reveal when k < k′.
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Instructions (Treatment Loaded)
Welcome to this experiment on economic decision making.
Please read these instructions carefully. The experiment is conducted anonymously,
that is, you will not get to know which of the other participants interacted with you or
which participant acted in which role. Please note that now that the experiment has
started, you must not talk to other participants. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand and we will come to you.
In this experiment all participants act as workers. The workers in this experiment
differ with respect to their state of health. The state of health of a worker determines
his or her productivity and hence also the revenue of a fictional employer (played by
the computer). Furthermore, there are in total three different labor markets, which are
played on a rotating basis: labor market A, labor market B and labor market C. At the
beginning of each period, you will see a screen showing which market is being played in
that period. There are six different workers with different states of health.
Labor Market A Labor Market B Labor Market C
Worker 1 200 200 200
Worker 2 210 448 280
Worker 3 230 510 360
Worker 4 260 551 440
Worker 5 300 582 520
Worker 6 600 607 600
Average 300 483 400
Table 1: State of health of the workers 1-6 in the three labor markets.
In the table above you can see the different workers of this experiment and their state
of health. Suppose market B is being played in this period. If the fictional employer (who
is played by the computer) is hiring, for example, worker 3, then worker 3 will create a
revenue of 510 points for the employer. Worker 1 will create a revenue of 200 points due
to worse health. In a period where market C is being played the workers 1 and 3 create
revenues of 200 (worker 1) or 360 points (worker 3). The state of health of any worker is
of course completely fictional and is determined randomly by the computer.
The experiment lasts for 15 periods. At the beginning of a period a random draw will
determine whether you act in the role of worker 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, and you will also be
informed about the labor market being played in that period. Each group consists of six
workers of different states of health. There is exactly one worker 1, one worker 2, one
worker 3, and so on, and one worker 6 in each group. All workers 1 and 6 occur exactly
once in each group. As mentioned before you will be informed about the market being
played (A, B or C) at the beginning of a period.
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Your task in the experiment:
In each period all workers have to make the following decision. You choose whether
or not to buy a health certificate at a cost of 100 points. The health certificate will reveal
your state of health and will affect your payment in that period. Your payments depend
on whether you purchased the health certificate:
1. If you choose to buy the health certificate you will receive your state of health in
points as a wage payment minus the costs of 100 points.
2. If you do not purchase the health certificate your wage payment will be the average
state of health of all participants who did not purchase the health certificate.
All workers decide simultaneously whether to purchase the health certificate. When
you decide, you will not know how many (if any) of the other workers have chosen to buy
the certificate. You will also not know the final market wage when making your decision.
This information will be given only at the end of a period.
Once all workers have made their decisions you will receive detailed information on
the period’s results. The next period will begin as soon as all participants have read the
summary and clicked on “Continue”. Here is an example of the decision screen for market
A and worker 1 with a state of health of 200:
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Example:
Suppose market B is being played this period. The average state of health of all
employees is:
200 + 448 + 510 + 551 + 582 + 607
6
=
2898
6
= 483
The market wage would equal 483 points in this case. Now each worker decides whether to
reveal his or her state of health. Once all participants have made their choice everybody
will receive detailed information on the results. The table above also lists the average
state of health for the markets A and C.
Assume that the workers 3 and 5 have revealed their state of health. In this case
worker 3 would receive a wage payment of 510 points and worker 5 a wage payment of
582 points. Both chose to reveal their state of health and as a consequence both have to
pay the costs of 100 points. Worker 3 earns 510-100 = 410 points and worker 5 earns 482
points in that period. The other workers (1, 2, 4, and 6) do not have to pay the costs and
will receive the market wage as a payment. In this example the average state of health of
all workers who do not have a health certificate is: 200+448+551+607
4
= 1806
4
= 451.5 points.
This is also the market wage for the workers 1, 2, 4 and 6. In the experiment you receive
this information after you have made your decision.
As mentioned earlier, the experiment will last 15 periods in total.
After the experiment your earnings will be converted at a rate of: 500 points = 1
Euro. Furthermore, we will round up your payoff to the next 50-cent amount.
At the end of the experiment, please wait inside your cubicle until we call you to pick
up your payment. Please return any documents you have received from us.
If you have any further questions please raise your hand now!
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